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under certain circumstances, to bypass the requirement that an unclassified sum-
mary be provided to a potential deportee of classified information that serves as the 
basis for the action against him. In addition, the Justice Department may at some 
point issue new guidelines as to procedures for the use of classified information in 
nnmigration proceedings, an effort that we hope will provide greater clarity and as-
sure less opportunity for abuse. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In SUl.ll, the tack taken by the pending bill is untenable. H.R.2121 makes no ac-
commodation whatl;Qever to the national securit'lr concerns to which the Alien Ter-
rorist Removal Act was addressed. Its categorical ban on the use of classified infor-
mation in immigration proceedings fails to draw the balance between due process 
concerns and naiional security interests for which AJC advocated during Congress' 
consideration of til!; Antiterrorism Act in which those provisions were included. We 
\lIge this COIDJ.nittee, and the Congress as a whole, to reject the Secret Evidence Re-
peal Act and to adopt a more balanced approach. 
Mr. HYDE. Professor Cole. 
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR DAVID COLE, GEORGETOWN 
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 
Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have represented 13 peo-
ple in the last 13 years against whom the INS has sought to use 
secret evidence, and I think. the record in those cases belies the tes-
timony of Mr. Parkinson and Mr. Cooper that the government only 
uses secret evidence where there are true threats to national secu-
rity and, therefore, we can trust the government with this remark-
able power that it has taken upon itself. 
Of the 13 people that I have represented, all 13 were at one time 
alleged by the government to be threats to national security. Yet 
in none of those cases did the secret evidence charge the alien with 
engaging in any criminal activity, much less terrorist activity. In 
every case, the basic charge was guilt by association, not that they 
did something wrong, but they were associated-with the wrong 
people. -
Twelve of those 13 people are now living freely and peaceably in 
the United States with no apparent undermining of the national 
security. The thirteenth case, involving Mr. Mazen Al-Na.ijar is still 
pending. 
In every case that has reached final resolution, the courts have 
ruled against the INS, and the INS has forgone appeals available 
to it. 
I want to briefly touch on some of the stories in those cases, but 
first I want to make one legal point, going to the initial exchange 
between Mr. Chairman and Congressman Campbell regarding due 
process and aliens. 
The Supreme Court has said absolutely clearly that due process 
protects all persons. It talks about persons. All persons in the 
United States, whether citizen or alien, whether here illegally or le-
gally. And the case is Matthews v. Diaz. It is cited in footnote 4 
of my testimony. So ,there is no distinction between aliens and citi-
zens and there is no distinction between illegal aliens and legal _ 
aliens. . 
Secondly, the Supreme CoUrt has repeatedly said that the due 
process clause prOVIdes no lesser protections for aliens than for citi-
zens. . 
In Galvin v. Press, an immigration case, the Supreme Court said 
that since the alien is a person, an alien has the same protection 
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for his life, liberty and property under the due process clause as 
is afforded the citizen. The Supreme Court said the same thing in 
Kwong Hai Chew: ''The fifth amendment knows no distinction be-
tween citizens and aliens residing in the United States." . 
Mr. Cooper erroneously misled this committee in saying that the 
Supreme Court has sanctioned this practice as constitutional for 50 
years. The case he referred to is Jay v. Boyd. In that case the Su-
preme Court said no constitutional claim is presented. No constitu-
tional claim was presented. 
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided in Kwong Hai Chew v. 
Colding, in which a constitutional challenge to the use of secret 
evidence was presented, that the secret evidence could not be used 
to expel an alien who was living here. 
o It is interesting that Mr. Cooper twice conceded, both in his 
opening remarks and in his response to questions, that the INS 
cannot constitutionally use secret evidence to establish deportabil-
ity. That is precisely what the 1996 Alien Terrorist Removal Act 
allows the INS to do. What Mr. Ramer has said this committee 
should look to, the INS has conceded here is unconstitutional. 
Now just a couple of remarks about some of these cases, because 
I think it is a record that really speaks for itself. 
Nasser Ahmed, an Egyptian man locked up for 3V2 years re-
leased in November in New York: When he was initially locked up, 
the INS told him they couldn't tell him anything, not a word about 
the secret evidence a~ainst him. When we brought a constitutional 
challenge to the INS s practice, all of a sudden they found them-
selves able to divulge pages and pages of information which they 
previously said couldn't even be summarized without jeopardizing 
national security. , 
The immigration judge ultimately found that he didn't pose a 
threat to national security, the BlA affirmed, and Janet Reno de-
clined to intervene and overturn that finding. And he was released. 
Hany Kiareldeen, to my left, locked up for 19 months as a threat 
to national security: Again, initially told almost nothing about why 
he was locked up. Ultimately, all seven immigration judges who 
looked at the complete record in case found there was no basis to 
conclude that Mr. Kiareldeen was a threat to national security, and 
what became clear is that the principal source that the FBI relied 
upon was his ex-wife who was in a custody proceeding with him 
and had made repeated false accusations against him. 
Fouad Rafeedie, another Palestinian: The INS sought to expel 
him on the basis of secret evidence that he was associated with the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. That is all he was 
told. He was not alleged to have engaged. in any illegal activity on 
their behalf. The District Court for the District of Columbia and 
the D.C. Circuit for the District of Columbia held that the use of 
secret evidence against him was unconstitutional, the government 
declined to take an appeal, and let him remain in this country. 
Imad Hamad, a Palestinian in Dearborn: The government sought 
to use secret evidence to oppose his application for permanent resi-
dent status. The evidence showed only that he had attended a Pal-
estinian dinner. The jmmigration judge found that there vyas noth-
ing there that showed that he was a threat to national security. 
The BlA affirmed. 
• I 
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The Los Angeles Eight, a group of seven Palestinians and a Ken-
yan woman who were arrested In 1987 and locked up in a maxi-
mum security prison: The INS charged that they all posed a threat 
to national security and had to be detained based on secret evi 
dence. The immigration judge refused to consider secret evidence. 
Did the government appeal? No. It just let them ill out, all eight, 
~ho it origi.nally said could not be freed without jeopardizing na-
tIonal secunty. -
A month later, FBI Director William Webster testified in Con-
gress that the FBI had found no evidence that any of these people 
had engaged in any criminal or terrorist activity. All eight have 
now been out for 13 years. ·rne INS has granted three of them per-
manent resident status. 
, Finally, Mr. Mazen AI-Najjar, the one pending case, still de-
tained: The only thing he has ever been told is that he is alleged 
to be associated with a terrorist organization. They have not said 
how he is associated, what he did, they have never charged him 
with any criminal conduct, notwithstanding 5 years of criminal in-
vesti~ation in that case. 
ThIS record, I think illustrates that when you give the govern-
ment this kind of power, when you give them the power to use se-
cret evidence to present evidence behind closed doors which they 
know will not be challenged, you cannot trust them. Our Constitu-
tion and our legal system are not based on trust of the government; 
they are based on a notion that what best serves everyone's inter-
est is an open process in which everyone can see the evidence, in 
which the evidence can be challenged and in which the truth can 
be discerned. I 
Justice Frankfurter said, no better test for discerning the truth 
has ever been divulged than the opportunity to confront the evi-
dence and cross-examine adverse witnesses. This procedure denies 
that test for truth. So even if we are concerned-and we should be 
concerned about terrorist threats-why should we sanction a proce-
dure which is designed to get the wrong people, as it did in the 
cases of all the people that I have represented? 
Mr. HYDE. Could you bring it-you are through? 
Mr. COLE. I have come to my conclusion. 
Mr. HYDE. Thank you very much, Professor Cole. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR DAVID COLE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAw 
CENTER 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Chairmafi, members of the Committee, I thank you for inviting me to testify 
on the use of secret evidence in immigration proceedings. 1 I have an unfortunately 
long experience with this practice. Since 1987, I have represenW 13 aliens against 
whom the INS has sought to use secret evidence. At one time, the INS claimed that 
all 13 posed a direct threat to the security of the nation, and that the evidenc'! to 
support that assertion could not be revealed-in many instances could not even be 
summarized-without jeopardizing national security. Yet in none of· these cases did 
the INS's secret evidence even allege, much J.ess prove, that the alieps had engaged 
in or sUJlported any criminal, much le88 terrorist, activity. In most cases, the ~ov­
ernment s allegations, once revealed, consisted of no more than guil~ byass.l>clation: 
1 I speak here in my personal capacity, and not as a representative of Georgetown University 
Law Center or any other entity or person. 
III 
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it claimed that the aliens were associated with disfavored "terrorist" groups, but not 
that they actually engaged in or furthered any terrorist activity themselves. 
Today, one of the 13 remains in prison as his case is still pending. All the other 
clients are free, living a law-abiding and peaceable existence here in the United 
States, without any adverse consequences to the security of the nation. In every case 
that has reached a final determination, the INS has lost. Where the cases have been 
resolved in the federal courts, the courts have declared the use of secret evidence 
unconstitutional. Where the cases have been resolved in the immigration process, 
immigration judges have uniformly rejected the government's national security 
claims as unwarranted. 
In the meantime, however, substantial harm has been done. Nasser Ahmed, an 
Egyptian man living in New York, spent 3 and V2 years of his life incarcerated, mllst 
of it in solitary confinement, before his release last.J~ovember, when the Attorney 
General declined to overrule the Board of Immigration""Appeals' ruling that he did 
not pose _ a threat to national security and should be released. Hany Kiareldeen, a 
Palestinian from New Jersey, spent a year and a half in detention before the BIA 
and a federal court ordered his release in October 1999. And Mazen AI Najjar, a 
Palestinian from Tampa, Florida whose case is still pending, has been detained for 
three years, without criminal charges and on the basis of evidence he has never 
seen. . 
But it is not simply years of human beings' lives that have been lost. More broad-
ly, America's image as a country that cares about fairness, openness, and due proc-
ess has been seriously tarnished. Secret evidence is a tactic one associates with to-
talitarian regimes and military juntas, not free democracies. A remedy is needed, 
and H.R. 2121 is it. . 
The use of secret evidence poses insuperable challenges to the administration of 
justice. First, and most fundamentally, it is simply not possible to hold a fair adver-
sary proceeding where one side presents its evidence behind closed doors. The ad-
versary process is the best mechanism for determining the truth that we have yet 
identified, but it depends on each side being able to examine and respond to the 
other's evidence. Accordingly, every court to address the use of secret evidence in 
immigration proceedings in the last decade has declared it unconstitutional. 
Second, the INS's use of secret evidence contains practically no safeguards against 
abuse. It uses secret evidence against people who do not pose any threat to the na-
tional security, because in its view eVIdence can be submitted behind closed doors 
whenever it is classified and relevant, even if the individual involved does not him-
self pose a threat to national security. It uses secret evidence where there is no le-
gitimate need for the evidence to be secret, because it has been improperly classified 
by another agencY and the INS has no authority to declassify. It uses secret evi-
dence where it has no affirmative statutory authority to do so, such as in detaining 
aliens without bond. It has failed to keep any record of many of its secret evidence 
presentations, thereby defeating meaningful review. And while the INS has occa-
sionally provided aliens with declassified summaries of its secret evidence, neither 
statute nor regulation requires such a l'roduction, nor that the summary provided 
afford the alien a meaningful opportunity to respond. Accordingly, summaries are 
often not provided at all, and when provided, are often so general as to be entirely 
unhelpful. 
Third, reliance on secret evidence that cannot be challenged by one's adversarIes 
leads the government to engage in sloppy practices that would never be tolerated 
were it required to make its case in open court. As far as I can determine, the INS 
has relied almost entirely on hearsay presentations by FBI agents, and has failed 
to produce any original declarants, even in the clo!led-door proceedings. The FBI 
agents' presentations have sometimes taken the form of barebones assertions, not 
even providing the judge with sufficient information to make an independent assess-
ment of the reliability of or basis for the allegations. And the INS and FBI have 
relied on innuendo and rumor, even where its own records raise serious questions 
about the validity of its charges. 
Fourth, there has never been any showing that the use of secret evidence is nec-
essary. In no other setting is the government permitted to deprive someone of hib 
liberty without affording him a meaningful opportunity to respond to the pvidence 
against him. In criminal cases, secret evidence is never pernutted, no matter how 
serious the charges, and no matter how much confidential or classified information 
the government has implicating the defendant. This rule applies to the prosecution 
of terrorists, spies, and mass murderers. We have survived as a nation for over 200 
years abiding by that basic rule of due process. There is no reason we cannot and 
should not extend the sarne rule to inunigrants when we seek to deprive them of 
their liberty and either imprison them or deport them. 
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Finally, the use of secret evidence is counterproductive. It poisoDB the truth-find-
ing process, so we cannot even be certain of whether we have properly identified 
threats to national security. It embroils the government in protracted litigation be-
cause the adversary process is ill-suited to this practice. And most problematically, 
it encourages cynicism, paranoia, and distrust in immigrant communities, because . 
closed-door proceedings understandably make people fear the worst. That paranoia 
and distrust in turn impedes the ability of law enforcement to identify true threats 
in immigrant communities, because it means that the FBI and INS will be viewed 
as enemy rather than protector. 
I support H.R. 2121 because it seeks wend this practice. It would repeal existing 
statutory authorio/ for the use of secret evidence to deport aliens, to deny them re-
liei from deportation, or to detain them. Its premise is that the practice cannot be 
mended, and therefore should simply be ended. I agree with that premise, because 
at bottom the use of secret evidence cannot be squared with the due process guaran-
tee of notice and a fair hearing. In this testimony, I will show why that is so P.i! 
a matter of constitutional law and illustrate why it is so by pointing to the INS's 
dismal track record in secret evidence cases. 
1. A CASE STUDY 
I want to begin with a case study. Hany Kiareldeen is a thirty-one year (,ld Pal-
estinian who came to the United States on a student visa in 1990 and lives in New-
ark, New Jersey. From March 1998 to October 1999, he spent 19 months in prison 
solely on the basis of secret evidence-an uncorroborated bare-bones hears.,y re-
port-that neither he nor his lawyers ever have had an opportunity to see. 
In 1997, Kiareldeen applied for adjustment of status to permanent resident based 
on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. On March 26, 1998, however, without ruling on 
his application for permanent resident status, the INS arrested Kiareldeen, charged 
him with being deportable for failing to maintain his student visa status, and took 
him into custody as a threat to national security. 
Kiareldeen has never seen the only evidence that the IN!;! ever offered to justify 
his detention, because the INS presented it in camera and ex parte. According to 
the undisputed claims of the immigration judges who reviewed It, however, the se-
cret evidence consisted of a report prepared by an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 
relaying extremely ~eneral hearsay allegations. Declassified summaries of the evi-
dence provided to Kiareldeen disclosed three allegations: (1) that Kiareldeen was as-
sociated with an unidentified "terrorist organization," and "maintains relationships" 
with other members and "suspected members" of "terrorist organizations," also un-
identified; (2) that "(an unidentified] source advised" that about a week before the 
World Trade Center ("WTC") bombing, Kiareldeen hosted a meeting at his residence 
in Nutley, New Jersey, where some individuals discussed plans to bomb the World 
Trade Center; and (3) that "[an unidentified] source advised Kiareldeen expressed 
a desire to murder Attorney General Janet Reno." The INS never introduced any 
evidence in open court to substantiate any of these allegations. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 
1999 WL 956289, *15 (D. N.J. Oct. 20, 1999). 
The immigration judge handling Kiareldeen's case initially ruied, in May 1997, 
that the government's secret evidence justified his detention as a security threat. 
At that time, the INS told Kiareldeen only that the evidence showed that he was 
associated with terrorists and posed a threat to the Attorney General, charges so 
general that he could not possibly rebut them. 
After Kiareldeen obtained more detailed summaries of the evidence, he did rebut 
the government's case in open court. He proved, for examplek. that he did not even 
live in the apartment where he supposedly met with World 'll'ade Center bombers 
until a year and a half after the alleged meeting took place. (The FBI's own records 
confirmed this fact.) He also showed that one of the SOll'C6S of secret evidence 
ag~nst him, his ex-wife, had made numerous false allegations against him in the 
course of a custody battle over their child. Kiareldeen sought to examine his ex-wife 
in open court, but the INS vigorously opposed his attempts to do so, and she refused 
to testify about her discussions with the FBI. 
Seven immi~ation judges ultimately examined Kiareldeen's case on the complete 
record, including the government's secret evidence presentation and Kiareldeen's 
open court rebuttal-the judge who Conducted the immigration hearing and two sep-
arate three-judge panels of the Board of Immigration Ap~. It is rare for any 
judge-even an Article ill judge-to reject to a claim of national security by the fed-
eral government. Yet in this case, all seven jud,res flatly rejected the government's 
contention that Kiareldeen posed a threat to national security. 
Two judges directly diSCUBSed the quality of the government's evidence. The Immi-
gration Judge who presided at trial, Daniel Meisner, stated that Kiareldeen had. 
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"raised formidable doubts about the veracity of the allegations contained in the 
[~assified information]," and that in the face of repeated requests for more informa-
tIOn, the INS had refused "to answer those doubts with any additional evidence, be 
it at the public portion of the hearing or even in camera." Matter of Kiareldeen, 
A77-025-332, Decision of Immigration Judge (Apr. 2, 1999). He concluded that the 
classified evidence was Utoo meager to provide reasonable grounds to believe that 
[KiareldeenJ was actually involved in any terrorist activity." [d. 
BIA Judge Anthony Moscato, dissenting from a preliminary bond panel dedsion 
not to release Kiareldeen, wrote that the bare-bones character of the government's 
in camera evidence made it "impossible" for the BIA to exercise independent judg-
ment in assessing "either the absolute truth or the relative probity of the evidence 
contained in the classified information." Matter of Kiareldeen, A77-025-332, Deci-
sion of BIA Denying Request to Lift Stay of Release Order (June 29, 1999) (Moscato, 
J., dissenting). Judge Moscato criticized the INS for having provided no original 
source material and UUttle in the way of specifics regarding the source or context 
of the classified information." [d. He further noted that despite the immigration 
judge's continuing requests, the INS had provided ~no witnesses, neither confiden-
tial informant nor federal agent, to explain or document the context of the actions 
and statements referenced in the classified information or to document the way in 
which the classified information became known to the source of that information." [d. at 1-2.2 . 
On August 18, 1999, Kiareldeen filed a habeas c('rpus petition in federal district 
court in New Jersey, arguing that the use of secret evidence to deprive him of his 
liberty pending resolution of the deportation proceedings was both unauthorized by 
statute and unconstitutional. On October 20, 1999, the district court granted the pe-
tition and issued a writ of habeas corpus. The court ruled that the INS's reliance 
on secret evidence violated Kiareldeen's due process right to a fair hearing, finding 
that "reliance on secret evidence raises serious issues about the integrity of the ad-
versarial process, the impossibility of self-defense against undisclosed charges, and 
the reliability of government processes initiated and prosecuted in darkness." 
Kiareldeen v. ReM, 1999 WL 956289, *11 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999). The court also 
ruled that Kiareldeen had been deprived of his due process rights because the secret 
evidence at issue consisted of uncorroborated hearsay that "could not be tested for 
reliability" and did not allow the immigration judges "to conduct a meaningful ad-
ministrative review." [d. at *14-18. The court ordered Kiareldeen's immediate re-
lease. 
Later the same day, a three-judge bond panel of the BIA also ordered Kiareldeen's 
release, unanimously rejecting the INS's appeal of the immigration judge's decision 
to grant bond, and lifting its prior preliminary stay of Kiareldeen's release. Five 
days earlier, on October 15, 1999, a separate three-judge merits panel had unani-
mously affirmed the immigration judge's decision granting Kiareldeen permanent 
resident status, also finding that Kiareldeen had successfully rebutted the INS' 
charges against him.3 . . -
After obtaining temporary stays of Kiareldeen's release from the Attorney General 
and a Third Circuit judge, the INS decided, on October 25, 1999, not to pursue fur-
ther appeals available to it, and rel~ased Kiareldeen. The INS apparently concluded, 
after contending for more than a year and a half that Kiareldeen posed a national 
security threat, that he did not even pose a sufficient threat to justify pursuing its 
appeals. Kiareldeen is now a permanent resident alien, but has never received even 
an apology from the INS for taking a year and a half of his liberty from him. 
Kiareldeen's case is just one of many stories that could be told. I will now turn 
to the range of legal and practical problems raised by the INS's use of secret evi-
dence. 
II. THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS 
The use of secret evidence denies an alien the most basic guarantees of due proc-
ess: notice of the evidence against him and a meaningful opportunity to rebut it. 
2 The other two judges on this panel declined to lift the stay of Kiareldeen's release order 
pending appeal, but did not dispute in any respect Judge Moscato's characterization of the evi-
~M& -
3 Under the BIA's rules, separate panels consider appeals of bond determinations and appeHls 
of the merits of deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §3.19(d); 8 U.S.C. § 1226; Gornika v. INS, 681 
F.2d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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-
Accordingly, every court to address the issue in the last decade has found this prac-
tice unconstitutional.4 
As the Supreme Court has stated: 
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. 
One of these is that where governmental action serious!tn~ures an individual 
and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact fin' .t.the evidence used 
to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the inaividual so that he 
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 496. "'Fairness can rarely be obtained I:>Y secret, one-
sided determination of facts decisive of riJdlts.'" Goss v. Lopez 419 U.S. 565, 580 
(1975) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurrin~). 
Accordingly, even in ordinary Clvillitigation where physical liberty is not at stake, 
"it is . . . the firmly held mam rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of 
a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions." Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 
F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); see also Kinoy v. Mitchell, 
67 F.R.D. I, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (refusing to grant summary judgment on the basis 
of materials submitted in camera, because "[o]ur system of justice does not encom-
pass ex parte determinations on the merits of cases in civil liti~ation"). "[Tlhe very 
foundation of the adversary process assumes that use of undisclosed information 
will violate due process," and therefore "use of undisclosed information in adJudica-
tions should be presumytively unconstitutional." American-Arab Anti-Discrimmation 
Committee v. Reno, (ADC v. Reno), 70 F.3d 1045, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1995).6 
Applying these principles, a federal district court recently declared unconstitu-
tional the use of secret evidence to detain aliens without bond. In Kiareldeen v. 
Reno, 1999 WL 956289 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999), the district court granted habeas cor-
pus relief to an alien who had been detained by INS on the basis of secret evidence 
allegedly demonstrating that he was a threat to national security. As noted above, 
the court found that "reliance on secret evidence raises serious doubts about the in-
tegrity of the adversarial process, the impossibility of self-defense against undis-
closed charges) and the reliability of government processes initiated and prosecuted 
in darkness." Id. at *11. \ 
The Court in Kiareldeen followed the two most recent federal appellate court deci-
sions reviewing INS attempts to use secret evidence in immigration proceedings, 
both of which also held thejractice unconstitutional. In 1988, the INS asserted na-
tional security concerns an sought to rely on secret evidence of Fouad Rafeedie's 
alleged high-rank:imr membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine (PFLP), an allegedly terrorist group, to exclude him from the country upon 
his return from a trip abroad. A district court preliminarily enjoined the INS's ac-
tions on due ~roceBB grounds, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the injunction. Rafeedie 
v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 
880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989). On remand, the district court granted summary judg-
ment and held that the INS's attempt to rely on secret evidence violated due proc-
ess. Rafeedie v. 1NSl.. 795 F. Surp, 13 (D. D.C. 1992). The INS chose not to appeal, 
and abandoned its enort to expe Rafeedie. 
In Rafeedie, every judge to review the INS's actions found "'the government's 
basic position ... profoundly troubling.'" Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 525 (Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, J., concurring). The district court found that such a procedure "aft'ord[s] 
virtually none of the procedural protections designed to minimize the risk that the 
4The due process Clause protects all persons living in this country, whether citizen or alien. 
It protects even aliens Jiving here unlawfully: 
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The 
Fifth Amendment, as well as the FouIWenth Amendment, protects every one of these 
persons from deprivations of life, l;tJerty, or property without due process of law. Even 
one whose presence in this country is unlaWfUl, involuntary, or tTYUl8itory is entitled to 
that constitutional prorection. . 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also !.eng May 
Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) ("our immigration laws have long made a distinction 
between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are 
within the United States after an ent?" irrespective of its legality."); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 
522, 530 (1954) ("since he is a 'person, an alien has the same ,r-rotection for his life, liberty and 
property under the Due Process Clause 88 is afforded a citizen. ). 
6A later decision in ADe v. Reno, addressing a separate selective prosecution claim, was re-
versed and vacated by the Supreme Court under the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act, Reno v. American·Arab Anti·Discrimination Comm., _U.S._, 
119 S. Ct. 936 (1999), but that decision had no bearing on the 1995 decision's holding on the 
use of secret evidence. ' ' 
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government may err." Rafeedie, 795 F. Supp. at 19. The court of appeals compared 
the position of an alien having to disprove charges based on secret information to 
that of Joseph K in Franz Kafka's The Trial, and stated that "[ilt is difficult to 
imagine how even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a bnrden." 
Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 516. . 
1n 1995, the ~th Circuit unanimously held that the INS could not constitu-
tionally rely on ~sclosed information to deny legalization, an immigration bene-
fit, to two aliens accused of associating with a terrorist organization. ADC v. Reno, 
70 F.3d at 1066-71. The Ninth Circuit held that "[o]nly the most extraordinary cir-
cumstances could support one-sided process." [d. at 1070. The fact that the govern-
ment asserted national security and charged aliens with membership in a terrorist 
organization was not sufficient to justify reliance on secret evidence. [d. Again, the 
government chose not to pursue further appeals, and granted the aliens legalization. 
These cases in turn followed Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953), 
in which the Supreme Court relied on due process concerns to interpret an INS reg-
ulation not to permit the use of secret evidence to exclude aliens who live here and 
have due process protections. Chew was a lawful permanent resident of the United 
States who had left the country for four months as a seaman on a merchant vessel. 
Upon his return, he was threatened with permanent exclusion based on an immi-
gration regulation that allowed the exclusion of aliens on the basis of confidential 
information without a hearing. To avoid a "constitutional conflict" with the Due 
Process Clause, the Supreme Court construed the regulation not to apply to return-
ing lawful resident aliens, who have due process rights. [d. at 600-03. 
These cases establish a simple propoSItion: the use of secret evidence cannot be 
squared with due process. It makes a mockery of the adversary process. Ordinarily, 
aliens have a right to confront all the evidence against them, and to cross-examine 
the government's witnesses. In secret evidence J,)roceedings, the alien cannot cross-
examine, and often has no idea even of what the charges against him are. Ordi-
narily, aliens can object to the introduction of evidence in immigration proceedings; 
where evidence is produced in secret, the alien cannot make any objections, because 
he cannot know what the evidence consists of. Ordinarily, an alien is provided with 
notice of the charges against hinI; in a secret evidence proceeding he is not. In short, 
all of the requisites of a fair adversarial process are abandoned when the govern-
ment is free to introduce its evidence behind closed doors. 
The government generally cites three cases in arguing that it is constitutional to 
use secret evidence in deportation proceedings. None provides the support the gov-
ernment seeks. The first, Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), expressly disclaimed any 
constitutional holding. The case presented onlr a statutory challenge to the use of 
secret evidence to deny suspension of deportatIon as a matter of discretion, and the 
Court expressly noted that the alien had presented no constitutional challenge. Jay, 
351 U.S. at 357 n.21. Quite plainly, a case that does not even present a constitu-
tional claim cannot resolve that claim. The other two cases the government cites, 
from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, engage in virtually no constitutional analysis. 
They each dismiss the due process issue in a paragraph by misreading Jay v. Boyd 
as if it decided the constitutional issue, wholly disregarding the fact that the Court 
in Jay explicitly said it was not deciding that issue.6 
In hearings before the Immigration Subcommittee in February, Deputy (kneral 
Counsel for the FBI argued in defense of the use of secret evidence that while aliens 
are entitled to due process in immigration proceedings, they are not necessarily en-
titled to the full panoply of due process rights that citizens must be afforded when 
their liberty is deprived. No precedent supports a sliding scale of procednral due 
process protections depending on whether the person being deprived of his liberty 
IS citizen or noncitizen. But even if there were, it would not support the use of secret 
evidence, which deprives its targets not of some sort of deluxe options but of the 
most basic elements of due process: notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend 
oneself. -
m. THE INS'S USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS DEVOID OF MEANINGFUL SAFEGUARDS 
The basic due process problem with relying on secret evidence is exacerbated by 
the fact that the INS's regulations and procedures contain no meaningful safeguards 
against its abuse. And as the INS's track record illustrates, the abuses have been 
endemic. 
6 United States ex rei. Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 873 (1974); Suciu v. INS, 755 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1985). Indeed, the court in Suciu 
acknowledged that "as a matter of fairness and logic, the [due process] argument has consider-
able appeaI,H but then erroneously considered it "foreclosed" by Jay v. Boyd. Id. 
BEST AVAILABLE COPY 
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A. The Use of Secret Evidence is Not Restricted to Individuals Posing a Threat to 
National Security 
First, the INS does not limit its use of secret evidence to national security risks. 
Its re~ations permit it to use this extraordinary procedure anytime that it has 
classified evidence relevant to an application for an immigration benefit. If the INS 
had. classified ~vi~ence that an indiVld.ual's marria~ was not.bon~de, for example, 
an Issue that m Itself poses no secunty concern, Its regulations would nonetheless 
permit it to present that evidence behind closed doors. There is no requirement that 
It first attempt to make its case without relying on secret evidence. And most prob-
lematically, there is no requirement thllt it limit its use of this procedure to individ-
uals who truly pose a threat to national securi~, such as, for example, individuals 
who have committed or were planning to comnut criminal conduct threatening na-
tional security. -
~ordingly, the INS us~d secret evidence in 1997 t? oppose Imad H~ad's appli-
cation for permanent reSident status, even thou~ Its evidence (which it subse-
quently disclosed because it was im£~.irly classified), showed no more than that 
Hamad had attended a Palestinian . er/dance, on the basis of which the INS ar-
gued that he was associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 
Both an immigration judge and the BIA held that this evidence did not !lUpport de-
nying Mr. Hamad acljustment of statusl !IDd the INS did not pursue further appeals. Mr. Hamad now lives in Dearborn, Micnigan. 
More frequently, the INS maintains that individuals pose a threat to national se-
curity when the INS's own subsequent actions make clear that the evidence simply 
does not support the charge. Thus, in 1987, the INS arrested eight aliens in Los 
Angeles, charged them as deportable for being members of a group that advocated 
world communism, and sought to detain them as national security threats on secret 
evidence. When the immigration judge refused to take evidence in camera and ex 
parte, the INS simply allowed the eight to go free, belying its national security 
claims. At the same time, then, then-li'BI Director William Webster testified that 
an FBI investigation had found no evidence of terrorist or criminal conduct on the 
part of any of the eight, that the:y were arrested for their political affiliations with 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and that if they had been 
U.S. citizens, there would have been no basis for their arrest.7 Thus, in this case 
the ~overnment sought to use secret evidence at the same time that it admitted that 
the mdividuals had engaged in no criminal or terrorist activity. Later in the same 
case, the INS again tried to use secret evidence to deny two of the eight aliens legal-
ization under an amnesty law. The district court examined the eviaence in camera 
and found that it demonstrated nothing other than First Amendment-protected ac-
tivities. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069-70 
(9th Cir. 1995) (discussing district court finding and noting that the government's 
claims of national security were premised not on any individual conduct but on gen-
eral assertions about the PFLP). 
Similarly, the INS initially claimed that Fouad Rafeedie posed a threat to na-
tional security because he was a high-ranking member of the PFLP, it allowed him 
to remain free on parole, thus unaermining its own claims. And when a district 
court granted summary judgment against the INS and held both its use of secret 
evidence and a provision of the INA unconstitutional, the government did not pur-
sue further appeals, even though there is a strong presumption in favor of appealing 
decisions declaring statutes unconstitutional. Mr. Rafeedie now lives a peaceful and 
law-abiding existence in Texas. 
Imad Hamad, yet another man accused of posing a na~ional security threat, is 
also a permanent resident today. A Palestinian living in Michigan, he was also 
charged with bein~ associated with the PFLP, again on the basis of secret evidence. 
The immigrlltion Judge reviewed the evidence, but found nothing in it that war-
ranted denying Hamad's application for permanent resident status. On appeal, the 
BIA affirmed, and the INS did not seek further review by the Attorney General. 
As detailed above, the INS never charged Hany Kiareldeen with any criminal ac-
tivitr despite claiming that he posed a threat to national security. All seven judges 
to VIew the complete record in his case found no basis for the government's claim 
that he posed a national security threat, and the INS then declined to pursue its 
appeals Nasser Ahmed spent 3 and Y2 years detained, ostensibly as a threat to na-
. tional security. 
7 Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Nomination of William 
H. Webster, to be Director of Central Intelligence, tOOth Cong., 1st Sees. 94, 95 (April 8, 9, 30, 
1987; May 1, 1987), quoted in American-Arab Anti-Discriminaticn Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 
1053 (9th Cir. 1995). 
, 
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When an immigration judge and the BIA both ruled in 1999 that Nasser Ahmed, 
an Egyptian man who had been imprisoned for 3 and 1/2 years; should be released 
because the INS's evidence did not show that he posed a threat to national security, 
the INS initially sought Attorney General review. At the eleventh hour, however 
minutes before the deadline the Attorney General set for herself to decide whethe; 
Ahmed should go free or continue to be detained, the INS withdrew its request for 
Attorney General review. Quite plainly, the Attorney General was not convinced 
that Ahmed actually posed a national security threat. 
The only person I represent who is still detained on the basis of secret-evidence 
is Mazen AI Najjar. We have just filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf, and 
the case is still being briefed. But in his case, too, there are strong reasons to doubt 
the government's claims of national security. First, AI Najjar remained a free man 
until his deportation hearing concluded, yet the INS has never explained why he 
became a threat to national security only after the hearing was complete. He has 
been the subject of grand jury investigations since at least January 1996, yet the 
government has filed no criminal charges against him or those with whom he is as-
sociated. And the only reason that either the immigration judge or the BIA gave 
for detaining him as a national security threat was his alleged political association 
with a terrorist group-neither the immigration judge, the BIA, nor the INS itself 
has ever claimed that AI Najjar himself engaged in or supported any terrorist activ-
ity. Matter of Al Najjar, A26-599-077, Bond Decision of Immigration Judge 6 (June 
23, 1997); Matter or A1 Najjar, A26-599-077, Bond Decision of BIA 12 (Sept. 15, 
1998). 
It is my view that the use of secret evidence to deprive an individual of his liberty 
or to adjudicate an alien's request to remain here is neerly always unconstitutional. 
But even if one believed that it could be used in extreme cases posing extreme dan-
gers, the INS regulations do not restrict it to such cases. On the contrary, the INS 
has repeatedly used secret evidence even where it lacks sufficient evidence to charge 
any criminal conduct, much less criminal conduct threatening national security. 
B. The INS Often. Uses Improperly Classified Evidence, and Only Declassifies it 
When Its Actions are Challenged 
Whatever one thinks of the validity of secret procedures where evidence is prop-
erly classified, we can all agree that there is no justification for the procedure where 
evidence does not in fact need to be confidential. Yet the INS has repeatedly pre-
sented evidence in camera and ex parte that could and should have been disclosed 
from the outset. This is more the fault of the FBI, which is generally the classifying 
agency, than the INS, but it is a critical problem with current practices. 
For example, in 1998, the INS initially relied on secret evidence to exclude several 
Iraqis who were accused of being double-agents after the United SilJtes airlifted 
them from Ira~ on the heels of a failed coup attempt against Saddam Hu:;sein. 
When former Dlrector of Central Intelligence James Woolsey took their case on and 
brought substantial congressional and media pressure to bear on the INS, the gov-
ernment found that it was suddenly able to declassifY over 500 pages of the pre-
viously secret evidence. One of the Iraqis initially detained on secret evidence, Dr. 
Ali Yasin Mohammed Karim, has now had an opportunity to respond to the declas-
sified evidence, and on that basis the immigration judge in his ;::ase has rever!Jed 
herself and tentatively ruled that Dr. Karim is not a threat to national security and 
should be granted asylum and released.s . . 
Similarly, in NaBBer Ahmed's case, the government initially took the position that 
it could not even provide a summary of any the secret evidence against him without 
jeopardizint:: the national security. Yet when Ahmed filed a constitutional challenge 
to the INS s actions, it suddenly found itself able to provide a summary of many 
of its charges, and it eventually turned over more than 50 pages of declassified ma-
terial that had originally been submitted in secret. 1'he fact that the INS was able 
to disclose the evidence indicates that there was no need to submit it in secret in 
the first place. Moreover, on its face much of the evidence could not possibly have 
been properly classified. One allegation, for example, maintained that Ahmed was 
associated with Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, but that was hardly a secret, as 
Ahmed had served as Sheikh Abdel Rahman's court-appointed paralegal and trans-
lator during the criminal trial of the Sheikh. Other evidence initially classified but 
ultimately disclosed revealed that the INS's witness in the in camera proceedings, 
an FBI agent, argued that Ahmed should be detained because his detention by INS 
had made him a hero in the Muslim community and his release would increase his 
STirn Weiner, "At Rehearing, Iraqi Doctor Wins Round in Deportation," N.Y. Times, May 7, 
2000, at A19. 
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political stature. Matter of Ahmed, Decision of Immigration Judge and Declassified 
Excerpts from Classified Attachment (July 30, 1999). 
In still another case, that of Imad Hamad, it turned out that the "secret evidence" 
that the INS presented at Mr. Hamad's hearing in 1997 had previously been pro-
duced publicly and disclosed to the alien at an earlier stage of the proceeding. When 
the INS learned of this, it "decl888ified" the document and submitted it as part of 
the open record when the case was on appeal to the BIA. Quite plainly, the docu-
ment never should have been classified. 
These cases illustrate an inherent structural problem. The evidence that the INS 
generally presents in secret is not classified by it, but by another agency, usually 
the FBI. If the FBI overclassifies, as it apparently did in the cases described above, 
the INS has no authority to second-guess the FBrs judgment. Nor does the immi-
grati.on judge. Moreover, when an FBI agent makes a decision to classify, it is usu-
_ ally m the context of a counterterrorism investigation, where he is effectively weigh-
ing an abstract public right to know against the need for confidentiality of an inves-
tigation. In that situation, agents naturally err on the side of classifying. But when 
that evidence is then used to deprive an alien of his liberty, there is no requirement 
that anyone review the classification decision. In other words, no one aska whether 
the classification decision might come out differently when the interest on the otber 
side of the balance is not an abstract public right to know, but the very specific in-
terest of a human being seeking to regain his liberty. \ 
This structural flaw can lead to years of wholly unnecessary detention. If Nasser 
Ahmed had been provided at the outset of his detention with the information he was 
ultimately given, he would have been able to put on his defense immediately, and 
he would presumably have been released in short order. Instead, when he was ini-
tially detained he was told that nothing could be revealed about the secret evidence, 
and the immigration authorities, denied any meaningful response from Ahmed, or-
dered his detention. Only after he had sat for years in prison did.the INS disclose 
what could and should have been disclosed at the outset. Thus, here the overclassi-
fication literally cost a man years of his life. 
C. The INS Uses Secret Evidence Where it Lacks Statutory Authority to Do So 
One of the most common uses of secret evidence br INS is to justify detaining 
an alien without bond while his deportation hearing IS pending. This ~ractice can 
and has resulted in the detention of aliens for years without ever seemg the evi-
dence against them, even where the onJy formal charge against them is that they 
o"erstayed their visa. Yet there is no statutory authority for this practice. 
Congress has authorized the INS to use secret evidence in a variety of settings, 
an i H.R. 2121 seeks to repeal much of that authority, Thus, the INA today author-
izes the use of secret evidence to denr various forms of relief from removal, to ex-
cluie certain al,'e1's, and to deport "allen terrorists." But the only statutory author-
iza tbn to. use secr~t evidence to detain an individual while his deportation proceed-
ings are pending is 8 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(B) (1997), which aprlies onJy to "alien ter-
rorists" under special deportation hearings held in the Alien Terrorist Removal 
Court. The INS has never invoked the Alien Terrorist Removal Court procedures, 
but nonetheless has repeatedly used secret evidence to detain aliens not in those 
procedures, and not accused of being "alien terrorists." 
D, INS Regulations Do Not Require That the Alien be Provided a Meaningful Declas-
sified SumTTUJry of Secret Evidence 
INS regulations permit the use of secret evidence without even providing a sum-
mary of the evidence to the alien. While the regulations state that a summary 
should be provided when possible, there is no requirement that a summary be pro-
vided, or that the summary afford the alien a meaningful opportunity to respond. 
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(16) (1996), 242. 17(a), (cX4)(iv)(1996); 8 CFR 
§ 240.1l(c)(3Xiv) (1997). An alien may be told only that secret evidence shows that 
he must be detained, without even a hint as to what the evidence consists of or 
charges him with. That is the situation Nasser Ahmed faced when he was initially 
detained. The INS maintained that it could not tell him anything about the secret 
evidence whatsoever. In such a situation, it is literally impossible to present a de-
fense. ' 
Where summaries are provided, there is no requirement that they be meaningful. 
Thus, when Nasser Ahmed next faced secret evidence, in the course of his deporta-
tion hearing, the INS did give him a summary. But the Bummary consisted 801el-t 
of the allegation that he had an "888Ociatfon with a known terrorist organization. 
Matter of Ahmed, Deportation Decision of Immigration Judge 20 (May 5, 1997) The 
INS would not even discloBe the name of the group. The immigration judge correctly 
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characterized that summary as "largely useleBBt id., but the regulations impose no 
requirement that the summaries meet any standard whatsoever. 
The use of secret evidence virtually always makes a meaningful defense impos-
sible, but it indisputably does so where the government does not give the alien no-
tice of the specific allegations alfainst him. Yet in none of the cases in which I have 
been involved has the INS proVIded an adequate summary, and there is no regula-
tion or requirement in place to ensure that it do so. 
E. The INS Has Failed to Keep Records of Its Secret Evidence Presentations, Thereby 
Defeating Meaningful Review 
Finally, the INS has failed to keep records of many of its secret evidence presen-
tations. In Ahmed's and AI Najjar's cases, the immigration judges initially took evi-
dence in camera but made no record of the hearing. The absence of a record, of 
course, defeats any semblance of meaningful appellate review, particularly where 
the hearing was never open to the public so there is no check on government aBBer-
tions regarding what transpired. In these cases, the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
an appellate bodYl took new evidence outside the record and again ex parte and in 
camera, and basea its decisions on that extra-record showing. 
III. SECRET PROCEDURES ENCOURAGE RELIANCE ON QUF.sTIONABLE EVIDENCE 
In open proceedings, each party's knowledge that its evidence will be subjected 
to cross-examination and reouttal by its adversary creates crucial incentives. It 
means that any good advocate will test his or her evidence first, before it is sub-jected to testing in open court, and will not r'3ly on weak or questionable evidence. 
When one knows, by contrast, that the other side will never see the evidence, those 
checks do not operate. The INS's track record illustrates that secret procedures in-
vite abuse. 
First, the INS has relied heavily in its secret evidence presentations on hearsay, 
often in the form of reports drafted by FBI agents relaying accusations by hearsay 
sources. In the cases of Nasser Ahmed and Hany Kiareldeen, the immigration judges harshly criticized the government for its reliance on double and triple hear-
say, its failure to provide sufficient information to permit an independent assess-
ment of the allegations, and its failure, when questioned by the immigration judges, 
to produce any first-hand witnesses. In effect, it appears that the government 
sought to have the immigration judges simply defer to the judgment of its FBI wit-
ness that the alien posed a threat to national security. 
The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have held that reliance on hearsay 
in immigration proceedings, while not absolutely prohibited, poses serious due proc-
ess problems because it defeats the i>Ossibility of examining the witnesses. Bridges 
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 n.9 
(1974) (describing Bridges as holding that due process bars use of hearsay "as sub-
stantive evidence bearing on. . . A charge upon which a deportation order had been 
based"). Thus, many courts hold that the INS may not present hearsay unless it 
first shows that the original declarant is unavailable. See, e.g., Cunanan v. INS, 856 
F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 
1992); Dalla v. INS, 765 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1985); Kiareideen, 1999 WL 956289, 
at *14-*18. Yet the INS relies heavily on hearsay in its secret evidence hearings, 
and as far as I know, has never made a showing that the original declarants are 
unavailable. The presentation ·:;f ~vidence in secret makes it impossible for the alien 
to cross-examine the witnesees ag"inst him. When the secret evidence consists of 
hearsay, it is impossible even for th'J judge to question the sources. 
Secondt.~he INS has relied on extremely weak evidence in its secret presentations. 
In Hany Kiareldeen's case, it appears to have relied principally on accusations made 
by Kiareldeen's ex-wife, who was in a custody dispute with Kiareldeen and had 
made repeated false accusations against him. Its evidence alleged that Kiareldeen 
had hosted a meeting at his Nutley, New Jersey apartment a year and a half before 
he even moved into the apartment. 
In Nasser Ahmed's case, the FBI initially claimed in its secret evidence that 
Ahmed had disseminated to the press a letter from Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, 
who was then in prison, to the press. The letter complained of the Sheikh's prison 
conditions, but called for no violence. The FBI claimed in its secret evidence presen-
tation that the letter had nonetheless sparked a terrorist bombing in Egypt. Ahmed 
denied disseminating the letter, and proved that many other persons could have 
done so. The FBI subsequently admitted that it had no idea who had disseminated 
the letter, and the State Department reported that the terrorist incident had noth-
ing to do with the Sheikh, but was a retaliatory attack for an Israeli bombing in 
Southern Lebanon. Matter of Ahmed, Deportation Decision of Immigration Judge 
and Declassified Excerpts from Classified Attachment (July 30, 1999). In Ahmed's 
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case, the FBI ~nt also argued in secret hearinl;rs that Ahmed should be detained 
because the INS's detention of him had increasoo his stature in the Arab commu-
nity, and tha4; as a result upon his release he would be a more effective leader. [d. 
Finally, some of the secret evidence in Ahmed's case may have come from the E~ 
tian government, the very country that the immigration judge found would impnson 
and likely torture Ahmed for his affiliations with SheiKh Abdel Rahman if Ahmed 
were returned there. [d. 
These examples illustrate that one cannot short-circuit the adversary process 
without substantial costs, not only to the rights of those against secret evidence is 
used, but to the legitimacy of the truth-finding process itself. 
IV. THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS UNNECESSARY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
The government typically responds to the above concerns br. claiming that the 
government's interest in national security, coupled with the political branches' "ple_ 
nary power" over immigration matters, nonetheless justifies the use of secret evi-
dence. But there has never been any showing that national security in fact requires 
the use of secret evidence, and the government's track record strongly suggests that 
its identification of "national security" concerns is by no means trustworthy. 
As I noted at the outset, I have represented 13 aliens against whom the INS 
souJdlt to use secret evidence. In all 13 cases, the INS claimed that national security 
woUld be threatened. In 12 of the 13 cases, the aliens are now living freely in the 
United States, after the INS lost in court and then decided not to pursue avenues 
of appeal available to it. The very fact that in these cases the INS di<l. not even pur-
sue all of their appeals only underscores the weakness of the national security 
claim. If national security were genuinely at risk, one would expect the government 
to leave no stone unturned in its attempt to safeguard the nation. 
Even where national security concerns are bona fide, the use of secret evidence 
to deprive an alien of his liberty is unconstitutional. It is indisputable that secret 
evidence could never be used in a criminal case, whether the crime charged was es-
pionage, sabotage, or terrorism, and no matter how serious the national security 
concern. We have survived as' a nation for over 200 years despite our adherence to 
that absolute principle. There is no reason to believe that adoption of a similar prac-
tice in deportation cases would pose any greater threat. ' 
The Supreme Court has made clear that it will not countenance the use of secret 
evidence, even where claims of national security are advanced, to deprive aliens liv-
ing here of their liberty. It refused to permit secret evidence in Kwong Hai Chew 
v. Colding, even though the Attorney General had personally determined that the 
information could not be disclosed without prejudicing the national interest. 344 
U.S. at 592. When faced with INS claims that labor organizer Harry Brid~es's con-
tinued residence here was contrary to national security due to his associatlOns with 
the Communist Party, the Sup,reme Court nonetheless held that hearsay could not 
be used to establish deportability because he must be afforded the opportunity to 
confront the evidence against him. Bridges v. Wi.v..on: 326 U.S. 135, 152, 156 (1945).9 
As Justice Frankfurter wrote, "[t]he requirement of due process' is not a fair-weath-
er or timid assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trou-
ble.H Joint Anti·Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S, at 162. 
Finally, the use of secret evidence is counterproductive, even as a tool for fighting 
terrorism. It makes error all too likely, meaning that we may well focus on the 
wrong people. And more fundamentally, secrecy encourages distrust of government. 
And that distrust can itself impede law enforcement. Many aliens in Arab commu-
nities are deeply suspicious of federal agents now, and for good reason. Nearly all 
of the secret evidence cases of the past five years have involved Arab and/or Muslim 
aliens. If we believe that the Arab community is more likely to contain terrorists, 
a supposition that as Timothy McVeigh showed, is debatable, the last thing we 
should do is adopt tactics that make the entire community view law enforcement 
as the enemy. ,. 
v. H.R. 2121 RESPONDS TO THE ABOVE CONCERNS BY REPEALING STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
TO USE SECRET EVIDENCE IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS AND IN THE ADJUDICATION 
OF IMMIGRATION BENEFITS / 
H.R. 2121 provides a direct and straightforward remedy to all of the above prob-
lems. It repaals statutory authority for the use of secret evidence in deportation pro-
ceedings and the aqjudication of immigration benefits. If enacted, it would accord 
91n enacting the deportation provision at issue in Bridges, Congress specifically found that 
the Communist Party posed a threat to national security. S.lWp. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 
788-89 (1950). 
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to all aliens the fair procedures now provided to most. Because the use of secret evi-
dence is unconstitutional, unworkable, and unwise, I fully support this remedy. 
First, it would repeal authority for using secret evidence to deport aliens. That 
authority has only existed since 1996, and has never been invoked by the INS, so 
it is quite plain that we can survive without it. This provision would simply place 
all aliens living here on equal footing in removal hearings. 
Second, it would repeal authority for the government to deny immigration benefits 
based on secret evidence. Currently, the INA authorizes the government to deny 
even asylum on the basis of secret evidence. In Nasser Ahmed's case, the immigra-
tion judge initially found that although Nasser Ahmed had shown his eligibility for 
asylum on the public record, because he would be imprisoned and very likely tor-
tured if returned to Egypt, his application had to be denied based on secret evidence 
that Ahmed never saw. 
Third, the bill would make clear that aliens may not be detained on the basis of 
secret evidence while their removal proceedings are pending. As noted above, there 
is no existing affirmative statutory authority for this practice under current law out-
side the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, but the INS maintains that it has the au-
thority implicitly, and therefore it is wise to make clear that no such authority ex-
ists. 
Fourth, the bill would bar the government from using secret evidence to deny ad-
mission to returning permanent resident aliens, individuals paroled into the United 
States, and asylum seekers at the border. The bar on use against returning ~erma­
nent residents is already supported by Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13 (D. D.C. 
1992). Persons paroled into the United States-and asylum seekers under current law 
lack constitutional protection, but the use of secret evidence in these cast's presents 
all the same problems that its use presents in-proceedings against aliens who have 
entered the country, and accordingly I support this reform as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The defects of legal proceedings conducted in secret have been recognj,~ed for cen-
turies. In the Bible itself provided that under Roman law, a man c':,arged with 
criminal conduct should "have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer 
for himself concerning the crime laid against him." 10 Similarly, Wigmore, the noted 
expert on evidence, has written that "[flor two centuries past, the policy of the 
Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by 
cross-examination as a vital feature of the law." 11 It would be difficult to identify 
anythin~ more as fundamental to a fair legal process than the right of each party 
to examme and confront the evidence against it. When we deny that right to aliens, 
we not only denigrate their rights, but demean ow' own system of justice. 
Mr. HYDE. Mr: Homburger. 
STATEMENT OF THOMAS HOMBURGER, NATIONAL EXECUTIVE 
COMMITrEE, ANTI·DEFMiATION LEAGUE 
Mr. HOMBURGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon. 
I am Tom Homburger and- I am Vice Chair of the Anti-Defamation 
League's National Commission. In the past, I have chaired the 
Commission's-the Lea~e's National Civil Rights Committee as 
well as the Chicago RegIOnal Board. ADL is pleased to testify today 
as the Judiciary Committee considers H.R. 2121. 
Together with the American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith Inter-
national, Hadassah and the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, we 
represent organizations that have played leadership roles in sup-
port of civil rights, liberties and religious freedom in America and 
abroad. 
We have long stressed America's importance as a haven for per-
sons persecuted in their native land and have strongly supported 
broad due process protections for aliens. However, we strongly op-
pose the approach embodied in H.R. 2121 because it destroys a bal-
10 Acts 25:16 (Kin!!, James). 
II Wigmore on Evidence 1367 (3d ed. 1940) (quoted in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 
(1959)). 
